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Shared care of military and civilian patients has resulted in transmission of multidrug-resistant
Acinetobacter baumannii (MDR-Aci) from military casualties to civilians. Current typing tech-
nologies have been useful in revealing relationships between isolates of A. baumannii but they
are unable to resolve differences between closely related isolates from small-scale outbreaks,
where chains of transmission are often unclear. In a recent hospital outbreak in Birmingham,
six patients were colonised with MDR-Aci isolates indistinguishable using standard tech-
niques. We used whole-genome sequencing to identify single nucleotide polymorphisms in
these isolates, allowing us to discriminate between alternative epidemiological hypotheses in
this setting.
 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Hospital Infection Society.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Introduction
In the UK, military casualties are usually repatriated to Selly Oak
Hospital, Birmingham, where they are cared for alongside civilian
patients. Military patients from Iraq and Afghanistan are often
colonised with strains of multidrug-resistant A. baumannii (MDR-
Aci), which can spread to civilianpatients andhealthcareworkers.1–6
Molecular typing systems, such as pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis
(PFGE) and variable-number tandem repeat (VNTR) analyses, have
provided evidence of multiple concurrent or successive clonal
outbreaks in hospitals across the UK.7,8 However, these methods
have been unable to provide sufﬁcient resolution to determine
chains of transmission within apparently clonal outbreaks. Nor can
they provide detailed information on patterns of spread (e.g. the
inﬂuence of ‘super-shedders’, environmental persistence, staff
carriage or infection control practices), even though these questions
are important when considering where to focus ﬁnite infection
control resources.
A recent MDR-Aci outbreak in Selly Oak Hospital illustrates
some of these problems. Four military patients, admitted overtems Biology, University of
414 7163; fax: þ44 121 414
).
k.
f of The Hospital Infection Societya ﬁve-week period, were each found to be colonised with MDR-Aci
a few days after admission. Subsequently, indistinguishable isolates
were recovered from two civilian patients on the same unit.
Molecular typing distinguished isolates from this outbreak from
those recovered from a similar outbreak in 2007 (same PFGE type,
different VNTR type). However, such approaches were unable
to shed light on transmission events within the 2008 outbreak
itself.
Whole-genome sequencing represents the ultimate molecular
typing method for bacteria, because it samples the entire collection of
genetic information within each isolate. Pioneering work on the
‘Amerithrax’ strain of Bacillus anthracis illustrated the utility of this
approach as long ago as 2002.9 However, until recently, the cost and
technical complexity of bacterial whole-genome sequencing placed it
beyond the reach of the average diagnostic laboratory or academic
research group. This has changed in the last couple of years with the
advent of ‘high-throughput sequencing’ – an umbrella term for several
competing technologies that deliver genome sequences around one
hundred times more quickly and more cheaply than conventional
sequencing approaches (see the recent review byMetzker10). All such
technologies do away with the need for cloning of DNA in biological
systems and instead rely onmassively parallel in-vitro ampliﬁcation of
template molecules attached to a solid surface.
Several recent studies have shown that analysis of single
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) in bacterial genomes provides
a means of determining relatedness between epidemiologically. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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months to years.11–16 Furthermore, the massive depth of coverage
provided by high-throughput sequencing means that, when look-
ing for rare genomic changes, it becomes efﬁcient to pool samples
and identify variable loci by polymorphisms within the consensus
sequence. SNPs can then be quickly and easily assigned to indi-
vidual isolates by a small number of conﬁrmatory polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) analyses.
Despite the promise of these new technologies, at the outset of
this study, it remained unclear whether MDR-Aci lineages associ-
ated with individual patients harbour SNPs capable of providing
useful epidemiological information. We therefore applied one
particular high-throughput sequencing technology – 454 pyrose-




A. baumannii isolates were obtained from routine clinical samples.
Bacterial identiﬁcation and antibiotic susceptibility testing was per-
formed on the Vitek 2 system according to the manufacturer’s
instructions (bioMe´rieux, Basingstoke, UK), supplemented by Clinical
and Laboratory Standards Institute-recommended conﬁrmatory
testing. Isolateswere frozenonbeadsandstoredat20 C. IsolatesM1,
M2, M3,M4were obtained fromwound swabs frommilitary patients.
Isolates C1 and C2 were obtained from sputum cultures from civilian
patients. IsolatesC1-2aandC1-2bweredistinct colonies fromthesame
wound specimen, taken twoweeks after the initial isolate fromcivilian
patient C1. Isolates C1-3a and C1-3b were isolates from a different
wound specimen, taken at the same time as isolates C1-2a and C1-2b.
Multidrug resistance was deﬁned as resistance to 3 classes of
antibiotics (quinolones, extended-spectrum cephalosporins, b-lactam/
b-lactamase inhibitor combinations, aminoglycosides and carbapen-
ems). MDR-Aci isolates were sent to the Laboratory of HealthCare
Associated Infection for speciation and PFGE and VNTR analysis.
Antibiotic sensitivitieswereconﬁrmedbyagardilutionmethods in two
isolates (M1 and C1).
Isolation of genomic DNA and 454 sequencing
Genomic DNA was obtained from colony-puriﬁed MDR-Aci,
using the DNeasy DNA extraction kit (Qiagen, Crawley, UK). DNA
was sequenced using 454 Titanium protocols (Roche, Welwyn
Garden City, Hertfordshire, UK) at the University of Liverpool’s
Centre for Genomic Research. DNA samples from isolates M1 and
C1 were each sequenced on a quarter plate; the sample from isolate
C2 was sequenced on two quarter-plates. Approximately equal
quantities of DNA from isolates M2, M3, M4 and C1-2awere pooled
and sequenced on a full titanium plate.
Analysis of genome sequence and of sequence variants
High-throughput sequence reads were assembled using New-
bler 2.0.01.14 (Roche, Welwyn Garden City, Hertfordshire, UK). We
combined the sequence data from all MDR-Aci isolates to create
a consensus outbreak assembly. The gsMapper component of
Newbler was then used to map each set of sequence reads against
the consensus assembly. False-positive variants resulting from
sequencing errors were excluded, generating a set of high-
conﬁdence variants. This set was subjected to several additional
rounds of ﬁltering using xBASE-NG to generate a set of well-trusted
SNPs.17 During this process, we discarded:1. Insertions and deletions.
2. Variants present in <90% of mapped reads from the runs with
single genomes, or in <25% of reads from the pooled sample.
3. Variants with excess coverage, >1 SD from the mean (i.e. in
repetitive regions).
4. Variants occurring within 200 bases of a contig boundary.
5. Variants occurring in clusters [3 SNPs in 1000 base pairs (bp)].
6. Variants not ﬂanked by good quality coverage for 20 bp.
7. Variants where the ancestral state could not be determined by
reference to published genomes using BLASTN.
Validation of single nucleotide polymorphisms
All well-trusted SNPs were investigated by PCR and Sanger
sequencing. The sequences of the primers used for this purpose
were as follows: SNP1, TAAGGCAGAACAAAGCGTGA/AATCGGTTCT
GAGGTTTGGA (product size 222 bp); SNP2, GGTGAACCTTGGTGG
TGGTA/AGCTTTAATGGCTGCTCGAA (product size 222 bp); SNP3, CA
TTTCCGAAACCCTCTGAT/AGGCGGTATTTGATGATCTTG (product size
218 bp).
PCR products were puriﬁed by ethanol precipitation and
sequenced on a 3730 DNA analyser (Applied Biosystems, War-
rington, UK). The sequences of SNP loci from isolates C1-2b, C1-3a
and C1-3b were determined only by sequencing of PCR products.
Results
Description of the outbreak
MDR-Aci was isolated from specimens from ﬁve male patients,
admitted to the Selly Oak Hospital critical care unit over a six-week
period in late 2008. Three patients weremilitary (M1, M2, M3); two
were civilian (C1, C2). MDR-Aci was also isolated from a wound
swab from a military patient (M4) in a nearby trauma ward.
Figure 1 shows a timeline of the MDR-Aci cases on the critical care
unit. The critical care unit is split into a ten-bedded unit and a six
bedded-unit, separated by a narrow corridor. Most military patients
are admitted to the six-bedded unit, which includes a four-bedded
bay (beds 1–4) and a two-bedded bay (beds 5–6), separated by an
open thoroughfare to themain unit. Patient C1 was ﬁrst found to be
colonised while on the main ten-bedded unit, and was subse-
quently transferred to the six-bedded unit. The other four MDR-
Aci-positive critical care patients (M1, M2, M3, C2) were cared for
exclusively in the six-bedded unit.
All MDR-Aci isolates had an identical proﬁle by PFGE and
VNTR analyses and all fell within European clone 1 (J.F. Turton,
personal communication; data not shown).18 The antibiotic
resistance proﬁle was also identical for all isolates (resistant to
meropenem, piptazobactam, amikacin; sensitive to gentamicin
and tigecycline).
The ﬁrst MDR-Aci isolate was from patient M1. The last isolate
came from patient C2, who yielded a positive sample in week 7.
During our initial epidemiological evaluation, we assumed that all
military patients were colonised prior to admission. However, the
events leading to colonisation of the civilian patients remained
unclear. In particular, several epidemiological scenarios could
explain the acquisition of MDR-Aci by patient C2 (Figure 1):
1. Transmission from M1. C2 was nursed in a bed next to M1
during week 2.
2. Transmission from M2. C2 was nursed in a bed next to M2
during week 4.
3. Transmission fromM3, who occupied a nearby bed space in the





















ITU 6 bedded unit
Trauma unit
Main ITU
Figure 1. Timeline showing bedspaces of individual patients while in the 6-bedded bay of the critical care unit. Vertical bars indicate a positive MDR-Aci isolate from the patient and
their corresponding single nucleotide polymorphism genotype. Patient C2 had sputum samples sent for microbiological analysis on day 24 and day 42, fromwhich MDR-Aci was not
isolated. Patient C1 was initially admitted to the 10-bedded main section of the critical care unit, on the same day as patient M2 was admitted to the 6-bedded section. Patient C1
was ﬁrst found to be colonised with MDR-Aci two days after patient M2. The arrow shows proposed transmission from M2 to C2. ITU, intensive therapy unit.
Table II
Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) loci which vary between outbreak isolates
SNP loci
1 2 3
Locus tag AB57_2551 AB57_2001 AB57_1823











T. Lewis et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 75 (2010) 37–41 394. Transmission from C1, who occupied a nearby bed space in the
six-bedded unit in the week before MDR-Aci was ﬁrst isolated
from C2.
5. Acquisition from an unknown source, such as an environ-
mental reservoir or an unidentiﬁed patient or health worker.
Transmission from M4 was rendered unlikely by the lack of prox-
imity to C2 in time and space.
Whole-genome sequencing of outbreak strains
Complete genome sequence data were obtained from the initial
MDR-Aci isolates from the six patients plus one additional isolate
from patient C1 obtained two weeks after colonisation was ﬁrst
detected (C1-2a) (Table I). The consensus outbreak assembly output
by Newbler comprised 4110513 base pairs, containing 107 contigs
500 bp. Average contig size was 38416 bp, with an assembly N50
of 79 057 bp. The largest contig was 230 667 bp. As predicted from
multiplex PCR and PFGE analysis, the outbreak strains align most
closely with sequences from other representatives of European
clone 1 (data not shown).8
Detection and interpretation of SNPs
Several hundred variants were discarded (supplementary data)
during the ﬁltering of variants to create high-quality informative
SNPs associated with three polymorphic loci (Table II). TheTable I







M1 102 493 4115447 9.6 1
C1 68 448 4094862 6.6 1
C2 43 540 3991503 4.3 0
Pool of 4 isolates
(M2, M3, M4, C1-2a)
601 802 4117083 53.3
(w13 per isolate)
5
SNP, single nucleotide polymorphism.
a Number of reads generated in each run.
b Number of nucleotide bases aligned to the reference consensus genome.sequences at each SNP locus in each isolate (including those that
had not been genome-sequenced) were determined by PCR and
Sanger sequencing. For the genome-sequenced isolates, there was
complete agreement here with the 454 data. The SNPs were placed
in a biological and phylogenetic context by reference to the
complete genome sequence of the European clone 1 strain
AB0057.19 This comparison identiﬁed the M1 isolate as bearing the
ancestral genotype at all three SNP loci.
The ﬁrst SNP distinguishes all the other outbreak isolates
(M2, M3, M4, C1, C2) from the ancestral/M1 state. A second SNP
separates the C1 isolate from all the other isolates, and a third SNP
differentiates the M3 isolate from all the other isolates. No SNPs
were detected between isolates from patients C2, M2 or M4.
Interestingly, patients M2 and M4 were injured in the same inci-
dent and had similar pathways of care until arrival in Selly Oak
Hospital. However, once in Birmingham, patient M4 did not come







AB0057 C A G
M1 C A G
M2 Ta A G
M3 Ta A Ta
M4 Ta A G
C1 Ta Ta G
C2 Ta A G
The corresponding annotation for each locus is shown for the ancestral strain
AB0057.
a Alleles demonstrate variation from the ancestral state.
T. Lewis et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 75 (2010) 37–4140If we assume that all military patients acquired MDR-Aci before
arrival in Birmingham, then SNP 1 must have been acquired before
admission and so patient M1 cannot be the source of any of the
civilian cases (Figure 1). Transmission of MDR-Aci from C1 or M3 to
C2 is ruled out by the very low probability of reversion to the
ancestral state for SNPs 2 and 3. Therefore, we conclude that the
most parsimonious interpretation of the data is that patient C2
acquired MDR-Aci from patient M2.
Discussion
Current typing systems have provided valuable insights into the
epidemiology of MDR-Aci. However, we postulated that whole-
genome sequencing might provide more detailed resolution
between bacterial isolates from a hospital outbreak. Here, we have
shown that closely related MDR-Aci lineages contain SNPs that can
shed light on transmission eventswithin a small-scale outbreak and
can discriminate between alternative epidemiological hypotheses.
Our analyses support transmission of MDR-Aci from the wound
of a military patient M2 to the respiratory tract of a civilian patient
C2. As MDR-Aci was not isolated from C2 until several weeks after
M2 left the adjacent bed, however, we cannot determine when and
how transmission occurred. One possibility is that C2 became
colonised when the two patients were nursed together, but that
colonisation did not reach detectable levels in the sputum until
much later. Another possibility is that M2 contaminated the local
environment and C2 acquired the organism from the environment
only after M2 had left the ward. This latter option would be
consistent with a signiﬁcant role of the environment in trans-
mission of MDR-Aci, as suggested by others.20–24
Other uncertainties remain in the epidemiology of this
outbreak. In particular, we were not able to determine the source
and mode of MDR-Aci transmission to patient C1. The isolate from
this patient contained an SNP not present in any of the military
isolates, and, prior to detection of MDR-Aci, this patient never came
into close proximity with any other patients known to be colonised.
Curiously, one of the ﬁveMDR-Aci isolates from this patient (C1-2a)
possessed three additional SNPs not found in any of the other
isolates (data not shown). The coexistence of two closely related
but distinct lineages of MDR-Aci in samples from the same patient
remains puzzling and perhaps reﬂects two separate acquisition
events before arrival in Birmingham.
In conclusion, we have highlighted the potential of whole-
genome sequencing in the analysis of hospital outbreaks. It is
worth stressing that in considering only well-validated SNPs, we
have been conservative in our analysis. In future studies, additional
phylogenetic analyses (e.g. of short repeats, indels or rearrange-
ments) twinned with genome ﬁnishing methods, such as gap
closure, might provide further discrimination between closely
related MDR-Aci isolates.
It is also clear that additional studies are needed to benchmark
genomic variability within populations of MDR-Aci colonising
individual patients, to determine how frequently SNPs arise within
a lineage, to dissect the local, national and global population
genomics of A. baumannii at the highest resolution possible and to
optimise use of this technology in hospital infection control. In
addition, this technology is certain to illuminate key biological
differences between isolates by revealing the genetic determinants
associated with virulence or antibiotic resistance. Furthermore, as
improvements in high-throughput sequencing result in reduced
costs and increased efﬁciency, whole-genome sequencing will
increasingly come within the reach of clinical microbiology lab-
oratories. It is possible that genome sequencing will replace gel-
based methods as the typing method of choice for nosocomial
pathogens.Sequence data
High-throughput sequencing reads have been deposited to the
NCBI Short Read Archive under reference SRA010038. Supple-
mentary data are available from http://pathogenomics.bham.ac.uk/
acinetobacter/
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